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Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge
Transfer: “The Uneasy Case” of
Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject
Matter Jurisprudence
Dmitry Karshtedt*
One aspect of Justice Stephen Breyer’s discomfort with patents, as
expressed in his opinion for the Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus and his
dissent from the order dismissing certiorari in LabCorp v. Metabolite, is
strikingly similar to one of his critiques of copyright law in The Uneasy Case
for Copyright, a well-known article he wrote as Professor Breyer more than
forty-five years ago. In The Uneasy Case, Breyer argued that the burdens on
duplication of technical articles imposed by copyright law restrict the flow of
information and prevent scientists from enjoying spillover benefits of published
research. His patent opinions on the Supreme Court, too, talk of diminished
access to information resulting from intellectual property protection. In this
Article, I contend that the parallel that Justice Breyer implicitly draws between
the harms of copyright and patent is a questionable one. In particular, Justice
Breyer’s opinions on patentable subject matter do not address the notion that
inducement of disclosure and dissemination of information is one of the very
purposes of patent law, nor the idea that there are many noninfringing uses of
information contained in patents. I argue that these omissions may provide an
insight into Justice Breyer’s patent law jurisprudence—particularly, the recent
reinvigoration of limits on patentable subject matter in his opinion for the Court
in Mayo.
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To be sure, Justice Breyer’s position can be defended. For even though
patent law does not generally place barriers on access to information, claims
like those at issue in Mayo and LabCorp may create narrow, subtle informationflow problems through recitation of mental steps at the point of the invention’s
novelty. I argue, however, that these problems can be solved by applying
correspondingly narrow rules of novelty or claim construction to invalidate such
patents or to limit their scope, making resort to the overbroad rule announced
in Mayo unnecessary.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Stephen Breyer has long been concerned with barriers to
knowledge transfer that intellectual property rights threaten to impose.
One of the claims in The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs—a wellknown article he wrote when he was Professor Breyer—was that
copyright in technical materials restricts the flow of information and
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thus thwarts the goal of promoting innovation.1 Specifically, Breyer
contended that photocopying of “texts and other scientific, professional,
or technical books and articles” has “various spillover benefits similar
to those provided by the original distribution of the works copied.”2 He
explained that these benefits include “intellectual stimulation, greater
productivity, and increased research,”3 and maintained that “to
discourage [such materials] from being copied is therefore particularly
undesirable.”4 The worry that copyright law would inhibit
dissemination of information also turns up in Justice Breyer’s copyright
opinions on the Supreme Court—in particular, in his dissents in Eldred
v. Ashcroft5 and Golan v. Holder.6 Discussing his Eldred dissent, Justice
Breyer made clear his belief that the extension of the copyright term
would “unnecessarily block dissemination” of older works and thereby
“fatally impede” efforts to learn from them.7
In a similar vein, and using language mirroring that found in
his copyright writings, Justice Breyer has voiced concerns about the
effect of patents on the disclosure and dissemination of information in
his patent law opinions. For example, in his dissent from the dismissal
of certiorari in LabCorp v. Metabolite, Justice Breyer justified limits on
patentable subject matter in part by positing that “[s]ometimes [the]
presence [of patents] can discourage research by impeding the free
exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the
use of potentially patented ideas.”8 Comparable language appears in
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the unanimous Supreme Court in Mayo v.
Prometheus,9 which invalidated the patent claims asserted in that case
as directed to an unpatentable law of nature (or, alternatively, a natural
phenomenon).10 His dissent in Stanford University v. Roche, a case that
did not even deal with patent eligibility, likewise mentions “restricted
dissemination.”11 And as if to preview and summarize all these views,
1.
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 316–18 (1970).
2.
Id. at 318.
3.
Id. at 315–16.
4.
Id. at 318.
5.
537 U.S. 186, 266 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6.
132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7.
STEPHEN BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (2004).
8.
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari).
9.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)
(stating that patents “can impede the flow of information”).
10. Id. at 1296–97.
11. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S.
776, 795 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer noted in a monograph published shortly after he became a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that “the
production, use, and dissemination of much information is protected by
copyright and patent laws.”12 These statements reveal a concern that
patent law, like copyright law, can erect barriers in the way of
information flow.
In this Article, I examine this claim. I argue that any suggestion
that patents can “impede the flow of information”13 cannot be validly
made without considering the disclosure-forcing function of patents.
This function appears to be significantly less legally salient in copyright
law, which does not even require disclosure for protection.14 As the
Supreme Court observed in Eldred v. Ashcroft, disclosure is something
that is “exacted from” the patentee by law,15 while disclosure in the
copyright context is something the rights owner frequently opts for
voluntarily when he or she wishes to make a profit from selling copies
of a work, performing the work publicly for a fee, and so on.16 In contrast
to creators of copyrightable works, inventors can often profit

12. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 27 (1982).
13. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
14. For a leading case, see Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir.
2003) (arguing that it is not paradoxical to allow copyright to be obtained in secret documents); see
also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that “Salinger
has a right to protect the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the term of his
copyright”); Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 17, 30–32), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2809957 [https://perma.cc/
DGD7-57XH] (discussing the role of copyright law in protecting privacy interests). See generally
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Trade Secrets and the “Philosophy” of Copyright: A Case of Culture
Crash, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 299 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2011) (discussing the interplay between copyright protection and trade secrecy).
15. 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (emphasis omitted). One could argue that copyright law induces
disclosure by way of incentivizing creation, which is often followed by disclosure. See Norman
Siebrasse, A Property Rights Theory of the Limits of Copyright, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 10 (2001)
(“We cannot assume that goods unprotected by copyright will be freely disseminated, since creators
will seek alternative forms of protection, such as trade secret or contract.”). But while Justice
Breyer’s copyright jurisprudence may be open to similar criticisms as his patent law jurisprudence,
it seems clear—and the Eldred Court’s reference to “exaction” suggests—that the disclosureforcing function of the patent system is a more powerful and independent rationale for patent as
opposed to copyright protection. See 35 U.S.C § 112 (2012) (mandating disclosure requirements in
patent law); cf. infra note 21 (indicating that there are no registration requirements for copyright
protection). Interestingly, there is also a strong First Amendment undercurrent behind
dissemination of information once it has been created, see infra notes 83–100 and accompanying
text, but seemingly less of a First Amendment concern behind having reduced creation and
circulation of ideas due to reduced copyright protection.
16. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216–17 (“For the author seeking copyright protection, in contrast [to
the inventor seeking patent protection], disclosure is the desired objective, not something exacted
from the author in exchange for the copyright. Indeed, since the 1976 Act, copyright has run from
creation, not publication.”). An exception might be copyrighted software code. Breyer, supra note
1, at 349 n.269.
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handsomely even if they opt out of the patent system and keep their
innovative ideas completely in the dark as trade secrets.17
Indeed, the complaint that patents restrict information flow is
generally something of a non sequitur because patent law, on the whole,
is supposed to do the opposite: inducement of disclosure of information,
which an inventor might well have refrained from revealing, is one of
patent law’s widely acknowledged purposes.18 It is true that patent
disclosures are often far from perfect.19 And it is also true that inventors
17. Trade secret protection is effectively unavailable for “self-revealing” inventions, see infra
note 130 and accompanying text, and can be extinguished by reverse engineering even for
inventions that are not, sometimes resulting in wide disclosure. But some trade secrets can last a
long time. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Nat. Biologics, Inc., 395 F.3d 897, 899–900 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a trade secret right was successfully maintained in a product “on the market since 1942”). On
the choice between patent and trade secret protection, see Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice
Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 380 (2002) (arguing that firms might opt for trade secret protection
even where patent protection is available). But cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
489–91 (1974) (expressing doubt that firms will opt for trade secret as opposed to patent protection
for “clearly patentable” inventions). Concurrent patent and trade secret protection is often
possible. See Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 1, 3–4 (2012) (arguing that the effective elimination of the best mode requirement by the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act may allow for concurrent patent and trade secret protection for
overlapping subject matter). But patent law’s requirement of disclosure, see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012),
limits this strategy. Cf. Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable
Patent Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. REV. 261, 299–331 (2012) (discussing
the possibility of trade secret protection followed by patent protection).
18. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–52 (1989)
(explaining that the patent system mandates disclosure of an invention in exchange for the
exclusive rights to practice the invention); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation
of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962) (arguing that “[w]ith suitable legal measures, information may
become an appropriate commodity”); Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from
Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132 (2002) (arguing that inventors are more
likely to reveal inventions with patent protection); Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 16–21, 27 (2012) (arguing that inventors provide certain information because
patents exist); Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S84
(1990) (arguing that patents increase human knowledge and productivity); see also Note, The
Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2005)
(explaining that some court decisions have “embrace[d] the disclosure rationale as a centerpiece of
patent policy”).
19. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 139–46 (2006)
(“The patent system has a number of structural flaws that inhibit the ability of a patent to perform
its teaching function.”); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19–20; Note,
supra note 18, at 2021–23; see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539,
539–40 (2009) (maintaining that “[p]atent disclosure is essential” but contending that “the
disclosure function is underperforming”); Paul Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.: Notes
on a Closing Circle, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 91 (“Artfully drafted specifications may defeat the
disclosure objective. In any event the extent to which the scientific and engineering communities
rely on these documents for instruction is speculative at best.”). See generally Sean B. Seymore,
The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010) (arguing for the centrality
of patent law’s disclosure function and proposing mechanisms for improving it).
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might sometimes disclose information without patent protection,
whether via scientific articles, products that could be reverseengineered, or other means.20 Nonetheless, the disclosure role of
patents is substantial and cannot be ignored.21 As noted by one
commentator, “Disclosure requirements in patent law advance
dissemination of knowledge and trigger new research initiatives and
scientific discoveries.”22 These benefits can be achieved via disclosures
in patents themselves, as well as via “peripheral disclosures” of the
claimed invention in presentations, scientific articles, negotiations with
potential business partners, and the like.23 It follows that the effect of
diminished patent protection might be a net reduction in the volume of
disseminated ideas, which is a result that Justice Breyer wishes to
avoid.
There are ways in which one can defend the proposition that
patents might impede the flow or exchange of information. One
consequence of “avoid[ing] the use of potentially patented ideas”24 might
be reduced knowledge creation or acquisition. Information that is never
generated because of patents on certain research tools and methods
cannot, a fortiori, “flow”25 or be “exchange[d].”26 Furthermore, Justice
Breyer could mean that patents reduce the flow of informationembodying goods, such as machines, chemical compositions, and other
technological products, by making them more expensive.27 Finally, the
availability of certain types of patents might discourage the sharing of
early-stage research in contravention of academic norms.28 All of these
arguments might justify the bottom-line conclusion that it is possible
for patents to generate disclosure-related detriments. But, as I show in
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 545, 546–47 (2012) (arguing that researchers use patents as a source of technical
information). Moreover, patents are issued only after an examination and are indexed and
searchable, while copyright protection does not even require registration. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)
(2012).
22. LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 10 (2007).
23. Arrow, supra note 18; Rantanen, supra note 18. But see J. Jonas Anderson, Secret
Inventions, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917 (2011) (arguing that trade secrecy can be socially
preferable to patenting); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 274–82 (2012) (arguing that intellectual property rights are not
always necessary for facilitating information exchange). This debate, however, is simply not
addressed in LabCorp or Mayo.
24. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari).
25. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
26. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 127; see infra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 132–138 and accompanying text.
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this Article, these harms eventuate only in very limited circumstances,
which are not implicated by the patents invalidated in Mayo.
Moreover, even granting that at least some patents might have
serious negative effects on access to ideas or information, it must be
made clear that patent rights impact disclosure in ways that are quite
different from copyrights. An important part of Professor Breyer’s
argument in favor of reduced copyright protection for technical
literature is that, by making it more difficult to reproduce (and own a
copy of) a scientific article or a textbook, copyright impedes
dissemination of the article’s or textbook’s informational content.29 The
would-be reader, to be sure, can take a license, but in Professor Breyer’s
view, this hurdle would impose a serious burden on access to ideas.30 I
take no position on whether this conclusion is correct. Instead,
assuming that The Uneasy Case accurately characterizes the
information-access harms from copyright, I explain that these specific
concerns, to the extent that Justice Breyer appears to have relied on
them in his patent opinions,31 do not cleanly translate to patent law.32
For one thing, there is a multitude of ways to use the information
in a patent without infringing the claims.33 For example, follow-on
researchers are free to rely on patent disclosures to develop new
theories and design products outside the scope of the patent’s claims,34
prepare to make products within the scope of the claims after the
expiration of the patent,35 and otherwise make use of the information

29. Breyer, supra note 1, at 333, 333 n.212; see also id. at 315–36, 315 n.135.
30. Id. at 317–18.
31. See discussion infra Section II.A for textual arguments along these lines.
32. It is also worth noting that the copyright cases in which Justice Breyer dissented
involved the specific problem of term extension or restoration—another contrast from patents, for
which the term is a lot shorter and has not been recently extended.
33. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1279, 1315–21 (2014); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257, 261, 290–92 (2007); Fromer, supra note 19, at 547–54; R. Polk Wagner, Information
Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995,
1003–10 (2003).
34. See, e.g., Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 574 (1863) (“Every man has a right to
make an improvement in a machine, and evade a previous patent, provided he does not invade the
rights of the patentee.”); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“Designing around patents is . . . one of the ways in which the patent system works to the
advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose.”).
35. Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“[N]either intent nor preparation constitutes infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271.”),
superseded on other grounds by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (amended 2010), as recognized in
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and Lang v. Pac.
Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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in a patent’s specification without practicing the claimed invention.36
More importantly, patents can serve to educate others of the
developments in the field and signal to competitors what not to do.37
Patents generally control a very small fraction of the uses of ideas that
are disclosed in them,38 and that is certainly true of many of the patents
invalidated in Mayo’s wake.39 All of these observations compel a critical
reexamination of Justice Breyer’s analysis in Mayo and LabCorp.40
The Supreme Court in Mayo concluded that the claims at issue
were patent-ineligible within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 after
characterizing them as directed to a law of nature unadorned by an
“inventive application.”41 The rule that Justice Breyer first suggested
in LabCorp and wrote into law in Mayo is broad: the case’s “sweeping
language”42 brought down numerous patents, leading a former Patent
Trial and Appeal Board judge (who presumably had to apply the rule)
to note that the rule originating from Mayo has resulted in the
“dismemberment of the patent system” and a shift to “trade secret as

36. See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 898 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“[T]he patent statute does not identify the mere dissemination of data as a potentially
infringing activity . . . .”); id. at 898 (“Filing a patent application is generally not an infringement
of a patent.”). Indeed, as long as downstream inventors are not engaged in the activities of making,
using, or selling within the scope of the claims, they are free to develop improvements to the
patented devices or processes and patent those improvements without the permission of the owner
of the upstream patent. In this respect, patent law poses less of a barrier to follow-on innovation
than current U.S. copyright law, since the latter denies protection for creative modifications to a
protected underlying work if permission of the owner of that underlying work has not been
obtained. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163–64
(C.D. Cal. 1989). I thank Bob Brauneis for suggesting that I make this point.
37. See infra Section I.C; cf. Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 259, 267 (2016) (arguing that “patent holders increasingly use their patents in patent
pledging scenarios, inter alia, in order to credibly and efficiently signal information to product,
labor, and capital markets about their research and development activities and preferences”);
Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 625 (2002) (arguing that patents can be a
means to publicize information in a credible way).
38. See supra note 33.
39. See infra notes 165–177 and accompanying text.
40. Of course, while copyrights forbid only copying of protected subject matter, patent
protection is not limited to copying. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in
Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1424–37 (2009). In addition, once someone has accessed a
copyrighted work, that person can make use of the ideas in the work as long as he or she does not
copy the expression, while patent law renders actionable activities, such as making or selling, that
fall within the scope of the claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see also infra notes
65–66 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, unlike copyright law according to Professor Breyer in
The Uneasy Case, patent law generally lacks mechanisms to prevent access to information “at the
front end,” thereby foreclosing any use of the ideas in the disclosure. See Breyer, supra note 1.
41. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–98, 1304–06
(2012).
42. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Linn, J., concurring), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
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[the] sole form of intellectual property” for some industries.43 I argue
that Mayo’s breadth may be a result of a miscalibration stemming from
an exaggerated concern for patents’ disclosure-related harms and
insufficient consideration of their disclosure-related benefits. Indeed,
while the Court does mention some benefits of patents, addressing their
role in providing incentives to innovate,44 a discussion of the value of
disclosure is nowhere to be found in Mayo (or, for that matter,
LabCorp).45 An important argument in favor of patentability—one that
could well have affected the sweep of the patentable subject matter test
that Justice Breyer ultimately fashioned—may have simply been left
off the scale. And although the result that the specific claims asserted
in those cases should be unpatentable is correct46 and may even be
justifiable on very narrow, and subtle, disclosure-related grounds, these
particular concerns can be addressed with a proportional, minimal
approach that would not threaten numerous meritorious patents.
To be clear, Justice Breyer’s concern with impeded information
flow is not the only rationale for vigorous limits on patentable subject
matter. Much has also been said, including in Mayo itself,47 about the
role of preemption of downstream uses in justifying restrictions on
patent eligibility.48 One might even contend that it is preemption that
played the decisive role in Mayo and that disclosure is irrelevant. But I
43. Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (June 17, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice [https://perma.cc/
GA22-Y25T] (comments of Dr. Scott Kamholz).
44. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
45. A reference to patent disclosure does appear in Justice Breyer’s opinion dealing with
patent claim construction, see Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 848 (2015),
and his dissent on the issue whether the Bayh-Dole Act automatically vests patent title in federal
contractors, see Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563
U.S. 776, 795 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Breyer discussed patent
disclosure in his two patent opinions during the past term. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
136 S. Ct. 2131, 2135, 2145 (2016) (holding that the so-called “broadest reasonable construction
standard . . . helps ensure precision while avoiding overly broad claims, and thereby helps prevent
a patent from tying up too much knowledge, while helping members of the public draw useful
information from the disclosed invention and better understand the lawful limits of the claim”)
(emphasis added); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“Through a complex system of incentive-based laws, patent law helps to encourage
the development of, disseminate knowledge about, and permit others to benefit from useful
inventions.”) (emphasis added). But Mayo and LabCorp, Justice Breyer’s patentable subject matter
opinions, do not have any references to patent disclosure.
46. See infra Part III.
47. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–03.
48. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson:
Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1353
(2011); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1330–31 (2011) (cited in
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–02); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548
U.S. 124, 127–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari).
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believe that my focus on disclosure is justified for three reasons. First,
as other commentators have noted49 and as the Court itself suggested,50
concerns beyond preemption seemed to be at play in Mayo. Second,
Justice Breyer’s disclosure point cannot just be throwaway or errant
language. Given his long-standing concern with the relationship
between intellectual property and dissemination of knowledge, Justice
Breyer would not have made statements related to information access
in his opinions if he did not think that this rationale was important to
his bottom-line conclusion. The third reason to address disclosure is
that this aspect of Justice Breyer’s opinions has not attracted much
focus. While there is a great deal of literature critical of Mayo,51 very
little work has been done to understand Justice Breyer’s thinking in
these cases by taking as the starting point his views on copyright law.52
This approach may thus cast Justice Breyer’s patentable subject matter
jurisprudence in a new light.
49. Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1858, 1869–73 (2014) (arguing that preemption concerns cannot logically justify the result in
Mayo); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Current State of Patent Eligibility of Medical and Biotechnological
Inventions in the United States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGIES:
THE NEW BIOLOGY 84, 99 (Matthew Rimmer & Allison McLennan eds., 2012) (discussing
“deontological moral arguments for invalidating patents” such as those at issue in Mayo); Ted
Sichelman, Funk Forward, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS
OF IP 361, 370 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014); Katherine J. Strandburg,
Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 566–67 (2012).
50. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305 (invoking the concern that patents like those asserted in Mayo
might interfere with “sound medical care” (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American College of
Medical Genetics et al. at 7, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071917, at *7)).
51. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 426–27, 433–36
(2012); Chiang, supra note 49, at 1869–73; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 262–84 (2015) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Need Not Apply]; Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 341, 341–49 (2013); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A
Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1795
(2014) (“So far, the substance of the Court’s opinions [on § 101] has lacked much of the sharpness
and self-awareness that the Justices have displayed at oral argument. In its written work product,
the Court can do better.”); Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation
in Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 639, 667–72 (2014);
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2016); Jacob S. Sherkow,
And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 351, 351–58
(2013); Sichelman, supra note 49, at 370; David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754323 [https://perma.cc/Z9P9-PL3T]. But
see I. Glenn Cohen, Make It Work!: Justice Breyer on Patents in the Life Sciences, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 418, 419–28 (2014) (praising the approach in LabCorp and Mayo); see also KALI MURRAY, A
POLITICS OF PATENT LAW: CRAFTING THE PARTICIPATORY PATENT BARGAIN 104–12 (2013). For a
highly qualified defense of Mayo and a proposal for cabining the rule in that case, see Kevin
Emerson Collins, Patent-Ineligibility as Counteraction, 94 WASH U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748288 [https://perma.cc/N6N5-RLMV].
52. For a rare example, see MURRAY, supra note 51, at 104–12.
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The rest of the Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes
Professor Breyer’s ideas in The Uneasy Case and a follow-up essay, and
then discusses his copyright jurisprudence on the Supreme Court. This
Part also explains the value of access to copyrighted articles directed to
technical subject matter in the words of those who supported a fair use
defense to claims of copyright infringement for their copying. Part II
examines Mayo and LabCorp and evaluates the claim that patents
impede access to information. This Part shows that, while certain sorts
of patents directed to basic research might generate significant
information-flow concerns, the patents targeted by these Justice Breyer
opinions do not fall into that category. This Part accordingly questions
the rule of Mayo, and then considers objections to my critiques of Justice
Breyer’s approach in that case. Part III discusses a less obvious, more
limited rationale under which the specific patents at issue in Mayo (and
LabCorp) might cause information-flow problems, but concludes that
those problems are adequately addressed under some different,
narrower rule than that announced in Mayo.
I. FROM THE UNEASY CASE TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Uneasy Case
The Uneasy Case for Copyright, true to its title, is mainly about
copyright law. The article questions whether copyright protection is
necessary to incentivize the creation and publication of books,
particularly works of nonfiction, and examines whether significant
societal gains might be achieved by copyright’s elimination.53 Much of
the article focuses specifically on copyright protection for technical
subject matter—for example, Professor Breyer’s discussion of
copyrights in books focuses on tradebooks and textbooks.54 As suggested
in the Introduction, he strongly favored unfettered copying of these
materials. Professor Breyer explained that “much current xeroxing is of
texts and other scientific, professional, or technical books and
articles,”55 and that their reproduction should be minimally impeded
because “widespread dissemination of these kinds of works has various
spillover benefits similar to those provided by the original distribution
of the works copied.”56 The article also includes a lengthy discussion of
copyright in software; Professor Breyer expressed “substantial doubt on

53.
54.
55.
56.

Breyer, supra note 1, at 313–23.
Id. at 300–08.
Id. at 318.
Id.
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the present need for computer program copyright protection”57 and also
noted that “the case for future need is quite speculative.”58
In an essay responding to a critique of The Uneasy Case,59
Professor Breyer condemned the outcome of a trial in a well-known
case, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,60 that made his fears a
reality: a publisher had prevailed (in a judgment later overturned on
appeal on fair use grounds) against the libraries of the National
Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Medicine for
infringing its copyrights by making photocopies of scientific articles for
their patrons. Professor Breyer contended that this decision,
“forbidding libraries to xerox single copies of articles for research
purposes, threatens to impose a heavy ‘transactions costs’ burden upon
research and makes more urgent the need for a properly constructed
exemption.”61 He thus saw free photocopying of technical literature as
an important means of effectuating downstream benefits of scientific
research, including dissemination of knowledge and stimulation of
further scientific inquiry.
Professor Breyer’s interest in copyright in scientific
publications, one imagines, naturally led him to engage with patent law
in his seminal article. In some passages of The Uneasy Case, he
appeared to express the uncontroversial proposition that patents may
diminish social welfare by restricting access to the embodiments of
patented technologies.62 For example, in a footnote in a section
considering the abolition of copyright, Breyer noted that “a patent
provides its owner with a monopoly of an ‘idea’—a fact that limits the
marketing of competing products that might hold down the patented
product’s price.”63 In other passages of The Uneasy Case, however,
Professor Breyer seemed to exhibit a more distinctive, less common
concern about harmful effects of patents. He asserted that “patent
protection, by imposing a charge upon using an idea, inhibits the flow

57. Id. at 346.
58. Id. at 347.
59. Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75–83 (1972) (responding
to Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A
Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1970)).
60. No. 73-68, 1972 WL 17712, at *1–19 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 16, 1972), pet. dismissed, 487 F.2d 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
61. Breyer, supra note 59, at 80.
62. See also infra notes 157–164 and accompanying text; cf. Collins, supra note 33 (setting
forth the distinction between patenting embodiments and patenting knowledge).
63. Breyer, supra note 1, at 318 n.149; see also id. at 348 n.268 (arguing that “the need to
‘invent around’ patented ideas may waste development resources,” but not acknowledging the fact
that this could be a socially productive use of patents); cf. supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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of already-created ideas throughout the industry.”64 The notion that
patents can inhibit the flow of ideas—the dissemination of
information—is more particular, and identifies a potential source of
intellectual property harm that more closely aligns with some of the
specific concerns that Breyer had expressed about copyright. The “flowinhibition” argument suggests that patents might interfere not only
with the use of some patented embodiments, but also with the flow and
development of knowledge about the underlying invention—just as
copyright-driven restrictions on the distribution of scientific literature
might. As the following sections demonstrate, this argument is
pervasive in Justice Breyer’s intellectual property opinions.
Overall, The Uneasy Case demonstrates Professor Breyer’s
grave concerns with the effect of intellectual property rights on the
dissemination of information. In addition, although this work was
focused on copyright, it is clear that he saw patents as even more
pernicious because they protect “ideas,” as opposed to merely
expression.65 Missing from Professor Breyer’s short critique of patents
in The Uneasy Case, however, is an explanation of how exactly patents
protect ideas, as well as consideration of the fact that patents also reveal
ideas.66 As a scholar, Breyer did not have much more to say about
intellectual property, as he began focusing on administrative law. It
was not until his service on the Supreme Court that we again saw his
views on intellectual property.67
B. The Copyright Cases
Justice Breyer’s concern with barriers to knowledge transfer and
diffusion, long ago expressed in The Uneasy Case, is unmistakable in
his opinions on the Court. On the copyright side, Justice Breyer
dissented in Eldred v. Ashcroft68 and Golan v. Holder.69 In these cases,
Justice Breyer concluded that Congress unconstitutionally exceeded its
power under the Intellectual Property Clause in enacting, respectively,
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act and § 514 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the latter granting copyright

64. Breyer, supra note 1, at 348 n.268 (emphasis added).
65. Cf. supra note 40 (discussing idea-expression dynamics in patent and copyright).
66. Breyer does flag the trade secret option in the context of intellectual property protection
for software in The Uneasy Case, and even alludes to patent law’s disclosure function. See Breyer,
supra note 1, at 349 n.269. The value of that function, however, is never considered.
67. My research has not uncovered whether Judge Breyer authored any intellectual property
opinions while serving on the First Circuit.
68. 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. 132 S. Ct. 873, 899 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

1752

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:6:1739

protection to various foreign works that had previously entered the
public domain in the United States).70 In Eldred, he wrote that
copyright term extension would likely lead to “high prices [that] will
unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works”71 and create
additional costs of seeking permission from the copyright owner for
“historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database operators, and
researchers of all kinds—those who want to make the past accessible
for their own use or for that of others.”72 The upshot of this dissent was
that such restrictions clash with the values of a “Nation constitutionally
dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning,
and culture.”73 And in Golan, Justice Breyer, writing for himself and
Justice Alito, would have invalidated a “statute [that] inhibits an
important preexisting flow of information.”74 He lamented that the
majority allowed “Congress seriously to exacerbate” the “disseminationrestricting harms of copyright”75 and overlooked its “speech-related
harms.”76 The echoes of The Uneasy Case are loud and clear in these
opinions.
The views that Breyer first expressed in The Uneasy Case are
not limited to dissents. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, the Court
dealt with the question of whether the first-sale doctrine, which holds
that an authorized sale of a copyrighted work extinguishes the
copyright owner’s right in the copy that was sold and thus allows the
buyer “to dispose of [that copy] as he or she wishes,”77 applies to works
sold abroad and imported into the United States. Writing for the Court,
70. For an argument that intellectual property laws are not subject to strong constitutional
limits under a proper interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause, see Paul M. Schwartz &
William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual
Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2363–414 (2003). But cf. Raymond Shih
Ray Ku, Copyright Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 401 (2006) (criticizing the Schwartz-Treanor
thesis).
71. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 250.
73. Id. at 244.
74. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 906.
76. Id. at 907. See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text for more on the First
Amendment dimension of the harm at issue. In the patent context, however, First Amendment
arguments against intellectual property protection have rarely been explicitly made in briefs to
the Supreme Court, and would seem to be difficult to make. For one approach, see Peter Lee, “All
Life is an Experiment”: Research Tool Patents, Epistemological Monopolies, and the First
Amendment (UC Davis Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 348, Aug. 23, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract =2315256 [https://perma.cc/YB4A-RYAP]. But the First Amendment does
appear to be doing work behind the scenes in Mayo. See infra notes 96 & 109 and accompanying
text. For an explicit judicial First Amendment argument against certain patents, see Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1322–29 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring).
77. 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013) (interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012)).
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Justice Breyer explained that limiting the doctrine to sales made in the
United States would create “practical copyright-related harms” that
“would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer
activities.”78 One of the rhetorical questions in the opinion, “Are the
libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the millions of
books in their collections that were printed abroad?”,79 suggests quite
strongly that the harms include diminished information access and
calls to mind The Uneasy Case, as well as Justice Breyer’s dissents in
Eldred and Golan. Justice Breyer’s copyright skepticism, then, hinges
in large part on the worry about this sort of harm.80 What is particularly
interesting, however, is that the ideas Justice Breyer developed in The
Uneasy Case arguably had an even more significant impact on his
patent law jurisprudence. But before considering Justice Breyer’s views
on patents, I take a closer look at the precise nature in which copyright
law might interfere with the flow of information and then continue
exploring the point that patents can do just the opposite.
C. The Harms of Copyrights—and the Benefits of Patents?
As Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States81 and similar cases
show, many educators, librarians, and researchers have cared deeply
about unimpeded access to copyrighted articles.82 The merits-stage
amicus brief of the National Education Association to the Supreme
Court, for example, argued for fair use based on “the public’s right to
receive information and ideas and the public’s right to read,” as
animated by the First Amendment.83 Likewise, the amicus brief for the
78. Id. at 1358.
79. Id. at 1364.
80. Justice Breyer recently authored an opinion in favor of copyright holders in American
Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502–12 (2014). But that case concerned
primarily entertainment, not learning or scientific research. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 949, 954 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing “legitimate
noninfringing uses” such as “research information,” “public domain films,” “historical recordings
and digital educational materials,” and “news broadcasts past and present,” among others, in a
copyright infringement lawsuit involving a defendant that operated a peer-to-peer network).
81. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); see
supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994).
82. Starting from Williams & Wilkins itself, all of these cases were hard-fought and attracted
significant amicus involvement. Many lower-court and certiorari-stage briefs in Williams &
Wilkins are helpfully collected in 1 THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS CASE (THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS
COMPANY V. THE UNITED STATES) (Marilyn G. McCormick compiler, 1974).
83. Brief of the National Education Ass’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent at 23,
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (No. 73-1279), 1974 WL 187546, at
*23 (citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). There is something special about access
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Association of Research Libraries and other library organizations
emphasized the importance of “dissemination of knowledge” in
furtherance of “scholarship and research.”84 And an amicus brief to the
Court of Claims in this case—joined, interestingly enough, by the Mayo
Foundation—emphasized that “open communication of knowledge and
ideas is an essential characteristic of a free society.”85 The United States
in its merits brief to the Supreme Court was in accord, contending that
“[a] liberal application of the fair use doctrine is essential with respect
to scientific works precisely because unless these works are
disseminated, absorbed, and commented upon, their purpose will not be
served.”86
The Court of Claims agreed with these sentiments in a closely
divided opinion left undisturbed by the Supreme Court’s 4-4 affirmance.
As summarized by a contemporary commentator, the Court of Claims
was significantly motivated by a “concern over the detriment to medical
and scientific research if the photocopying were held unlawful.”87 In the
court’s own words, one of the reasons it found fair use was that “[t]here
has been no attempt to misappropriate the work of earlier scientific
writers for forbidden ends, but rather an effort to gain easier access to
the material for study and research.”88 The court explained that “the
law gives copying for scientific purposes a wide scope” and that the
record “demonstrate[d] injury to medical and scientific research if
photocopying of this kind is held unlawful.”89 Although the Court of
Claims did not cite Professor Breyer, it certainly showed sympathy for
his views.

to information: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes an Article
titled “Freedom of expression and information,” which states that “the right to freedom of
expression” includes “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority.” Tellingly, this Article appears between Articles titled
“Freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and “Freedom of assembly and of association.”
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), art. 10, 11 & 12. The
doctrine of copyright fair use in the United States is said to reflect some of these values. See Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003).
84. Brief of Amici Curiae—Ass’n of Research Libraries et al. at 74, Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (No. 73-1279), 1974 WL 186244, at *74.
85. Brief of Amici Curiae—Ass’n of Research Libraries et al. at 27, Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (No. 73-68), reprinted in THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS
CASE, supra note 82, at 104.
86. Brief of Respondent at 24, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)
(No. 73-1279).
87. Marc R. K. Bungeroth, Case Note, Copyright—Photocopying as Fair Use—Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 16 B.C. L. REV. 141, 148 (1974).
88. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
89. Id. at 1362.
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These concerns persisted through time, manifesting themselves
again with an interesting twist when a corporate defendant claimed fair
use in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. In this case,
“plaintiffs American Geophysical Union and 82 other publishers of
scientific and technical journals . . . brought a class action claiming that
Texaco’s unauthorized photocopying of articles from their journals
constituted copyright infringement.”90 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the photocopying was not fair use, but
not without controversy—Judge Dennis Jacobs agreed with Texaco’s
position and wrote a strong dissent. In a discussion reminiscent of some
arguments in The Uneasy Case, Judge Jacobs argued that “the
photocopying of journal articles, and the use of them, is customary and
integral to the creative process of science.”91 He explained that having
a file of articles was important “to steer clear of repetition and dead
ends, to evaluate theories and hypotheses for possible theoretical
development or commercial application, to give credit to others,”92 and
so on.
Judge Jacobs’s arguments are well taken. In the practice of
science, existing published work often constitutes a guide to what not
to do, or at least a signpost of where there are gaps in research that
could be filled by follow-on investigators. Here’s how Texaco, the
defendant, explained the value of having access to files of scientific
articles: “Without awareness of new developments, our people could
continue to pursue work already conducted and reported by others. In
reinventing the wheel, we would waste time, manpower and
money . . . .”93 The purpose of the article file was to “us[e] the reported
work as a springboard to novel developments that would be the property
of Texaco.”94 In short, the value of access to scientific articles can often
be to learn what area of research has already been occupied, to provide
attribution where it is due, and to point the downstream researcher to
a different area of focus.
Patents, of course, can also play the role of disseminating
information to the benefit of society, including making others aware of
new developments and suggesting new areas of research.95 This would
90. 60 F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 935 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 933.
93. Brief of Appellees at 12, Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(No. 92-9341), 1993 WL 13030326, at *12.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 13–23 & 33–39 and accompanying text. Justice Breyer’s reasoning may
presuppose that equivalent information might be generated and revealed without the patent
incentive. On that point, see infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text.
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seem to make it difficult to argue, as has been done for copyright, that
patents could interfere with “the public’s right to receive information
and ideas and the public’s right to read.”96 The traditional role of patent
disclosure, to be sure, is to teach skilled artisans how to make and use
the claimed subject matter so as to satisfy the quid pro quo of the patent
system,97 and the effectiveness of this role of the patent document is a
matter of a great debate.98 But even this imperfect function of disclosure
surely has some value that must be weighed against any harm that
patents might do with respect to knowledge dissemination and creation.
Moreover, given the “what not to do” value and other peripheral benefits
of patent disclosures, it becomes clear that the informational
contribution of patents extends significantly beyond their foundational
teaching function.99 In the next Part, I further build on the observation
that, while Justice Breyer placed the potentially negative effects of
patents on the flow of information squarely at issue in Mayo and
LabCorp, he did not mention the disclosure benefits of patents.100
Specifically, I examine in detail the claim that patents such as those
litigated in these cases might significantly impede information flow.

96. Brief of the National Education Ass’n, supra note 83, at 23 (citations, quotation marks,
and emphasis omitted). But cf. Brief for Petitioners at 20, 47, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 3919717, at *20, *47
(repeatedly referring to “research and speech” as though chilling both generates the same sorts of
concerns); MURRAY, supra note 51, at 110 (arguing that Justice Breyer’s patent opinions protect
“the communicative basis of the doctor-patient relationship”); supra note 76 and accompanying
text; infra note 109 and accompanying text. But patents like those at issue in Mayo are not all
about communication—the doctor generally has to order a test for there to be actionable
infringement. For an argument that the patents litigated in Mayo are nonetheless problematic,
see infra Part III.
97. See supra notes 13–23 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 18–23 and accompanying text. In addition, there are problems with
patents’ effectiveness at putting others on notice of the extent of the patentee’s rights. See, e.g.,
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746–47 (2009) (questioning how well patent claims delineate property
rights); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010) (discussing
problems with the notice function of claims).
99. See also supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. To this end, Professor Sean Seymore
argued that there would be value in issuing patents that report negative results. See Sean B.
Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2048 (2012).
100. Cf. supra note 66.
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II. JUSTICE BREYER ON PATENT LAW: THE LINKS TO COPYRIGHT AND
“INFORMATION FLOW” CONCERNS
A. Justice Breyer on Patentable Subject Matter
Justice Breyer interpreted the subject matter exclusions implied
in § 101 of the Patent Act in his opinion for the unanimous Court in
Mayo v. Prometheus101 and in his dissent from the dismissal of certiorari
in LabCorp v. Metabolite.102 In these opinions, Justice Breyer endorsed
a vigorous role for the patentable subject matter doctrine as a limit on
what can be patented using justifications that unmistakably draw their
intellectual lineage from his copyright writings. In particular, Justice
Breyer focused not only on potential general social welfare losses from
reduced distribution of the embodiments of the patented technology,103
but also on restrictions on the flow of information and the development
of knowledge—an important concern of his dating back to The Uneasy
Case.104
Specific worries about the flow of information aside, Justice
Breyer’s patentable subject matter opinions reflect wide-ranging
concerns about the effects of patents on innovation that are expressed
in terms not unlike those he used with respect to copyrights. In Mayo,
Justice Breyer wrote that patenting of laws of nature and the like would
“inhibit further discovery”105 and “tend to impede innovation more than
it would tend to promote it.”106 In the LabCorp dissent, Justice Breyer
tied these concerns to a constitutional limit on the reach of intellectual
property in general, noting that “the reason for the exclusion is that
sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of
patent and copyright protection.”107 He also made an explicit parallel to
copyright law when he cited Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., a case
that stands for the proposition that copyright protection cannot extend
so broadly as to cover ideas as opposed to merely expression.108 These
points, in turn, seem to build on the explicit constitutional argument in
the Eldred dissent, where Justice Breyer contended that the “practical
101. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
102. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari).
103. Cf. supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
104. See supra Section I.A.
105. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
106. Id. at 1293.
107. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 126–27 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
108. Id. at 127 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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effect [of copyright extension] is not to promote, but to inhibit, the
progress of ‘Science’—by which word the Framers meant learning or
knowledge.”109 Although Mayo does not explicitly mention copyright or
the Constitution, the similarity of language across the three opinions is
too strong to ignore.
The parallels between Justice Breyer’s concerns with effects of
copyright and patent on information transfer are also quite apparent.
Indeed, his view that intellectual property rights threaten the flow of
information clearly comes through in his patent opinions. In LabCorp,
Justice Breyer wrote that patent rights might “imped[e] the free
exchange of information . . . by forcing researchers to avoid the use of
potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and timeconsuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring
complex licensing arrangements,” and, perhaps most importantly, by
“raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes
prohibitively so.”110 The parallel passage from Mayo is very similar: he
explained that patents “can impede the flow of information that might
permit, indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of
using the patented ideas once created.”111
In a puzzling way—because use and transfer are very different
activities—the use and transfer of information seem to be equated in
these passages. But the puzzle could be better understood once one
recalls that hindrance of transfer of information is a problem with
copyright that Justice Breyer identified in The Uneasy Case. The
problem is that no use of information can occur without its initial
transfer, which copyright law might prevent. And the quoted passages
from Mayo and LabCorp convey his apparent view that patent law, like
109. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing EDWARD C.
WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2002)). This dissent also indirectly addressed a related First Amendment
argument. See id. at 244 (“The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek related
objectives—the creation and dissemination of information.”); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873, 891–92 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (similar); supra notes 76 & 96 and accompanying text;
cf. Judith O’Neill, Recent Developments, Copyright—Extensive Photoduplication of Copyrighted
Scientific Journals by Libraries Does Not Constitute Copyright Infringement. Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 306, 310–11 (1974):
The constitutional argument is that the first amendment right of the American people
to freedom of speech coupled with their ninth amendment right to free dissemination
of information reduce the copyright holder’s protection to a privilege granted in the
interest of furthering the constitutional right of the people. . . . In no case . . . is the
encouragement of the author to frustrate the very purpose for which it exists, to afford
the people free and unobstructed access to information.
110. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added). Note that this language does not account for
the fact that one can use ideas disclosed in patents without infringing. See supra notes 33–39 and
accompanying text.
111. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
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copyright law, has an information-transfer problem that might, in turn,
interfere with “use.”112 But this contention does not take account of the
fact that patents might freely transfer the information in the first place,
nor of the notion that noninfringing uses of patents are ubiquitous.
Additional copyright-patent parallels abound in Justice Breyer’s
writings. By way of a further example, Mayo’s language may be
compared to that in his dissent in Golan, which issued two months
earlier. In that dissent, he argued for invalidation of a law that “inhibits
an important preexisting flow of information”113 and imposes
“administrative costs, and restrictions on dissemination.”114 Again, the
similarity in the approaches is sufficiently striking that one can make
a plausible inference that Justice Breyer sees patents and copyrights as
imposing analogous sorts of harms.115 This general concern with
intellectual property is succinctly captured in a footnote in The Uneasy
Case, in which Professor Breyer stated that “[i]ncreased circulation of
information would seem to be a critical factor in the creation of new
ideas.”116
Justice Breyer’s couching of information-access harms of patents
in similar terms to copyrights is perplexing because it characterizes the
patent system as doing essentially the reverse of its core function of
encouraging information disclosure and dissemination.117 As noted
earlier, the proposition is certainly not indefensible, but it would at a
minimum appear controversial and require significant unpacking.118
How could patents “imped[e] the flow of information” in spite of their
disclosure-forcing function? And is there something about the claims
litigated in Mayo and LabCorp, in particular, that presents
information-access problems? I first address the larger question of how
patents might impede the flow of information, and then discuss the
patents at issue in Mayo and the rule that came out of that case.

112. But cf. Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent
Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2016) (arguing that the rules of patent infringement liability are
consistent with the goal of encouraging technical communications).
113. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 912 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 903.
115. See also supra notes 71–75 & 109 and accompanying text.
116. Breyer, supra note 1, at 315 n.135. This footnote includes a “cf.” cite to a seminal paper
by Professor Kenneth Arrow, which somewhat cuts against Breyer’s thesis when it states that “no
amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something so
intangible as information.” Arrow, supra note 18, at 615.
117. See supra notes 13–23 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
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B. Patents as Threats to Information Flow
One way that patent law could impede the flow of information is
by allowing propertization of inventions that help scientists generate or
acquire useful knowledge. Patents on research tools like microscopes,
foundational techniques like gene splicing, and other patents that
might cover downstream research efforts may fall into this category.119
Concerns about upstream patents are surely not trivial and have been
raised by numerous commentators,120 including me.121 Discomfort with
such patents is partly reflected in the applications of the utility and
written description requirements of the Patent Act to prohibit the
patenting of the objects of research, like chemical compounds without
any known non-research uses122 and functions of as-yet unknown
drugs,123 respectively, in certain well-defined circumstances.
Furthermore, in a recent article, Professors Brenda Simon and Ted
Sichelman highlighted the anti-competitive effects of patents on
research-tool-type technologies that can help their owners to generate
a large amount of data that could be protected as trade secrets.124
119. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 48, at 1339 (expressing concern over “ownership of
generative building blocks”); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 10–17 (2001) (describing the dangers of upstream patenting to biotechnology research);
Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement,
Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1302–03
(2008) (expressing concern that research tool patents may have preemptive effects on research);
see also Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement of Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949,
976–81 (2015) (explaining that concern about the patenting of upstream inventions is pervasive in
U.S. patent doctrine and legal scholarship).
120. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of
Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1,
18 (1995); Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common
Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine To Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 82, 106–08 (2005) (arguing that patent law must distinguish “between
upstream, enabling resources . . . and downstream, end-product applications”); Arti K. Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 77, 124 (1999) (warning that upstream patents are “likely to inhibit creativity and thus
progress”); see also Mueller, supra note 119. See generally Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of
Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology
Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141 (2004).
121. Karshtedt, supra note 119.
122. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365,
1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring that, to comply with the utility requirement, the claimed
composition must have a “substantial utility” and a “particular benefit”).
123. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
124. Brenda M. Simon & Ted M. Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753547 [https://perma.cc/JQT8-5ZEJ]; see Dan L.
Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 233 (2015)
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Nonetheless, while the prohibition of patenting of objects of research is
at least relatively well-established,125 it seems inconceivable that a
patent system would completely fail to protect research tools like
microscopes, mass spectrometers, and the like,126 just because the
underlying technology has a role to play in the development of new
knowledge.127 In addition, as we will see, the patents asserted in Mayo
decidedly were not these kinds of patents.128
Patents could also slow the dissemination of information by
restricting access to information goods. Following along with the
language from Mayo, if patents “rais[e] the price of using the patented
ideas”129 by covering products embodying the ideas, then the products
would be less readily available due to higher prices and the flow of
information embodied in the products would be thus impeded. While
this is correct as a matter of economics, the argument seems to assume
away two related points. First, because a product embodying technical
information might not always reveal the underlying invention,130
dissemination of the product does not always equal dissemination of the
technical information. Second, products need not be disseminated for
the technical information to be transferred. Indeed, technical
information may be more effectively transferred via articles, technical
disclosures, technology-transfer agreements, and, perhaps, even
(suggesting that patents on personalized medicine inventions function primarily to aggregate
“ancillary information”).
125. See John F. Duffy, Embryonic Inventions and Embryonic Patents: Prospects, Prophecies,
and Pedis Possessio, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 234, 247 (F. Scott Kieff
& Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012); see also Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 120.
126. See Scott A. Chambers, Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated
with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 53, 53 (1995); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Reply to Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions
Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 61, 63 (1995)
(agreeing with Chambers on this point); cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the
Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 225 (1987) (“To allow [users] to
avoid infringement liability on the ground that the machine was used in research would eviscerate
patent protection for technologies used primarily in research laboratories.”).
127. In a recent paper, I argued that patents on objects of research and research tools present
similar problems, and that both types of inventions might best be subject to limited patent
protection. Karshtedt, supra note 119, at 983–85, 1021–28. In addition, expanded application of
the experimental use exception as a personal defense to infringement in well-defined
circumstances might modulate concerns regarding upstream patents. See infra notes 153 & 249
and accompanying text.
128. See infra Section II.C; see also Karshtedt, supra note 119, at 1106–07.
129. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
130. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 401, 426–32 (2010) (discussing self-revealing and non-self-revealing inventions);
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 107–18 (explaining the difference in the effects of patenting on self-revealing
as opposed to non-self-revealing inventions).
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patents.131 For this version of the argument that information would be
more readily disseminated without patents to be convincing, the
invention at issue would need to be developed and commercialized
without the incentive of a patent, and would also need to be selfrevealing (or to be accompanied by disclosures explaining how it works).
While that is surely possible under some circumstances, neither Mayo
nor LabCorp explains when such disclosures would eventuate. Given
the series of assumptions needed for the “embodiment-flow” argument
to work, and the lack of explanation from the Court, this argument is
therefore also suspect.
There is still another cluster of arguments that could be made in
support of the proposition that at least some patents slow rather than
promote disclosure. As Professor Rebecca Eisenberg cogently argued,
availability of patent rights for early-stage research might discourage
sharing of information between academic scientists.132 Instead of
participating in the communitarian culture of exchanging ideas as
quickly as they are generated, the argument continues, these
researchers will conceal the ideas then and aim instead to obtain
proprietary rights.133 By the time the information is finally revealed in
a patent application, the argument proceeds, the disclosure will be
delayed and will appear in the less digestible form of the unsavory
language of “patentese.” Indeed, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley
explained that “there is evidence that scientific papers from which
discoveries are patented are significantly less likely to be cited by
subsequent scientific papers, suggesting that patents may be restricting
the flow of scientific knowledge.”134 Relatedly, a number of
131. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
132. See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 180–85; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress
of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989). For a
challenge to this view, see F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 692
(2001). Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059 (2008) (discussing the phenomenon
of non-enforcement of patent rights against academic institutions); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Access to Bio-Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
N1, at ¶¶32–41 (reviewing empirical literature showing that academic scientists tend to ignore
patents). For a recent perspective, see Jacob S. Sherkow, Comment, CRISPR: Pursuit of Profit
Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172 (2016).
133. See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 180–85; Eisenberg, supra note 132, at 1017. The Mayo
Court alluded to early-stage research when it referenced “laws and principles [that] are ‘the basic
tools of scientific and technological work.’ ” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari). Thus, this argument
perhaps has the most support of the three in the language of Justice Breyer’s opinions.
134. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE
IT 88 (2009) (citing Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder
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commentators maintained that the subject matter of early-stage
research is usually the provenance of academic study, and it would thus
be disclosed without the need for patent-based incentives.135
These arguments are well-theorized and compelling. And in
some ways, they resemble the arguments against restrictions on the
copying of technical publications. First, in both circumstances, the
intellectual property right at issue puts up barriers in the way of
sharing information.136 Second, the right threatens to interfere with the
learning process.137 Third, the presence of exclusivity may cut against
what the creator of the information might naturally want, which is to
disseminate it as widely as possible.138 Nonetheless, the contentions
made by Professor Eisenberg and others concern a very specific class of
patents—those directed to basic or early-stage research. Outside of this
unique context, to suggest that patents routinely impede the
dissemination of information is counterintuitive. Moreover, as the next
Section explains, the patents actually invalidated in Mayo were hardly
drawn to the kind of invention that these scholars were concerned with.
In Part III, I make one more attempt to rehabilitate the informationflow rationale for holding these patents invalid, and in fact conclude
that they should be—under a narrowly tailored rule reflecting the
subtle nature of the problem. In the next Section, however, I evaluate
Prometheus’s patents under Professor Eisenberg’s specific rationale
that patents could interfere with disclosure.
C. The Patents at Issue in Mayo
I focus here on Mayo because, as opposed to LabCorp, the Court
in Mayo actually invalidated the patents at issue and set forth a rule of
law. The claim representative of those asserted was directed to
determining whether a patient who is receiving drug treatment for a
gastrointestinal disorder requires a larger or a smaller amount of the
drug based on the concentration of 6-thioguanine, a so-called
the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J.
ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 648 (2007)). But see Bhaven N. Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do
Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome 4 (NBER, Working Paper
No. 21666, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21666 [https://perma.cc/4MZ3-5MKW] (concluding
that “any effects of [gene] patents on follow-on innovation appear to be quantitatively small”).
135. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 120, at 119. But see Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parsimony
Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 1718 (2010) (“Given that vast rates of intellectual and
pecuniary capital may be required to successfully discover rules of nature that bear great potential
value for society, the utilitarian case for patent protection would appear to be strong.”).
136. Cf. supra notes 81–94 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
138. Cf. Brief of Respondent, supra note 86, at 24–25, 36.
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“metabolite” molecule, in the patient’s blood. Specifically, it recited the
following:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells
indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject.139

In simple terms, the claim was directed to a method of
determining whether a patient having a particular health condition is
getting the right dose of a particular drug. This method involved
measuring the concentration of the 6-thioguanine metabolite, which is
a substance that the patient’s body produces from the drug that the
patient actually ingests. Furthermore, the claim specified particular
metabolite concentration thresholds indicating whether the patient is
getting too much or too little of the drug. In this way, the patent
purportedly improved upon the prior art, which had disclosed the
general relationship between the amount of the metabolite and the
effectiveness of the drug, but without specifying the concentration
thresholds.140
This claim does not appear to generate the sorts of disclosurerelated concerns that were noted by Professor Eisenberg and others
because it is directed to applied, rather than early-stage, research.
Particularly telling is Professor Eisenberg’s own critique of Mayo—she
faulted the Court for invalidating the claim under the law of nature
exception because, in her view, it “recites a very specific diagnostic
application.”141 Moreover, it seems safe to assume that the claim does
not embody the sort of a critical invention that, if not promptly shared
and disseminated among scientists, would significantly slow down
139. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295 (2012)
(quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 20 ll. 10–25 (filed Apr. 8, 1999)).
140. C. Cuffari et al., 6-Mercaptopurine Metabolism in Crohn’s Disease: Correlation with
Efficacy and Toxicity, 39 GUT 401, 401 (1996).
141. Eisenberg, Need Not Apply, supra note 51, at 270; see also id. at 268; cf. Chiang, supra
note 49, at 1868 (contending that Mayo “never gives any theory for what constitutes a ‘law of
nature’ or explains why biological correlations fall within the category,” but instead “simply asserts
the conclusion”).
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academic progress. And while the invention might aid in the practice of
medicine, it is unlikely to be properly characterized as an object of
research—or even a research tool—whose patenting might create a
bottleneck for researchers looking to use it to open up new fields.142
The nature of the lawsuits in Mayo (and LabCorp) underscores
these points. In both cases, the accused infringers were not exactly
independent inventors, nor even downstream researchers attempting
to develop new areas of research based on what the patentees have
discovered. Instead, both defendants initially practiced the claimed
methods with the patent owner’s permission and then, essentially,
decided to stop paying royalties.143 To be sure, in Mayo, the Mayo Clinic
made an attempt to fine-tune the 6-thioguanine concentration
thresholds,144 but the parameters it ultimately settled on still ended up
within the scope of the narrow claims that Prometheus asserted.
What is more telling is that in Mayo in particular, it was
undisputed that the information in the Prometheus patents pointed to
areas of development that were not covered by the claims. As found by
the trial court, these applications included “use [of the correlations] in
research,” “building upon the correlations,” and “publishing articles in
scientific journals concerning the correlations.”145 These are the very
sorts of activities that, as Breyer worried in The Uneasy Case, might be
impeded when copyright law effectively blocks access to ideas in a
scientific article, forcing the downstream researchers to miss out on new
ideas that the information contained in the articles might elicit.146

142. See Lemley et al., supra note 48, at 1344 (“Here, the claim was to very specific
measurements of a particular drug. Like [LabCorp, Mayo] involves an application of the natural
principles discovered by the patentee. It is not generative, nor will it unduly bar future inventors.”);
Sichelman, supra note 49, at 376–78; see also Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 36 n.164)
(contending that “diagnostic inferences as a class are costly to invent and validate . . . and they are
not likely to be basic tools”); Sampat & Williams, supra note 134. But cf. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM.
ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND
LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 46 (2010)
(contending otherwise in the context of diagnostics specifically involving genes).
143. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295–96 (noting the fact that the defendant first bought the
patentee’s test and then developed its own test “using somewhat higher metabolite levels to
determine toxicity,” which infringed the patentee’s claims); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 129 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the order dismissing
certiorari) (similar).
144. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295–96. Inhibited here, it appears, were “more refined treatment
recommendations.” Id. at 1302.
145. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), 2008 WL
878910, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).
146. But cf. Note, Diagnostic Method Patents and Harms to Follow-on Innovation, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1370, 1384–87 (2013) (contending that the patents at issue in Mayo and LabCorp created
“fairly broad preemption problems,” including “prevent[ing] Dr. Rokea el-Azhary, a researcher at
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The trial court in Mayo held the claims invalid in spite of the
downstream applications left open by the patents based on its belief
that they lacked “practical uses other than treatment for autoimmune
or gastrointestinal disorders.”147 This conclusion evidences a certain
failure of scientific imagination and relies on a very narrow conception
of what is practical. It bears repeating that the accused infringers were
not barred from using the patent disclosures to develop new ideas and
theories; instead, they were performing more or less the very same test
that the asserted patents claimed. It is difficult to see how assertion of
infringement based on a repeatedly performed, commercialized variant
of the claimed invention threatens access to information or, for that
matter, the progress of science.148
If anything, the concern in some § 101 cases seems to be that
patents might impede the practice of medicine149—but, as Professor
Eisenberg explained, this concern is wholly separate from any worry
about effects on novel downstream research and development.150
Medicine tends to be a conservative field, and the technician running a
diagnostic test is to follow the protocol exactly as written, without
deviation. The aim of commercial diagnostic tests within the scope of
Prometheus’s claims was not novel, follow-on research, but more or less
exact—one might say mechanical151—replication to ensure that
accurate data was being collected for the purpose of effective patient
treatment. Access to scientific knowledge is not the same as access to a
product, even when the product happens to be a diagnostic test.152
The accused infringers in Mayo did, to be sure, refine the
relevant metabolite concentration thresholds. But it would seem that
those engaged in cutting-edge scientific research would, almost by
definition, not want to make a living optimizing the same relatively
narrow finding that was made by another.153 Prior work is a jumpingMayo, from disseminating her work on thiopurine metabolites in the dermatology context”). This
problem is addressed in detail in Part III.
147. Prometheus, 2008 WL 878910, at *12 (emphasis added).
148. Cf. Karshtedt, supra note 119, at 976–81 (explaining that § 101 could serve the role of
eliminating patents on upstream inventions that might threaten the progress of science).
149. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304–05 (relying on amicus briefs submitted by medical
practitioners).
150. See Eisenberg, Need Not Apply, supra note 51, at 263 (“Justice Breyer candidly reveals
a concern that patent claims might impinge on the practice of medicine, as distinguished from
future research.”).
151. Mechanical in a good way—because patient welfare is implicated.
152. The diagnostic test does allow the doctor to obtain information about a patient. But so do
stethoscopes and other tools. Cf. supra notes 119–128 (discussing patents on “research-tool”
technologies).
153. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. To be sure, some patents may be directed
to fundamental, or “bottleneck,” inventions that must be practiced for a research project to move
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off point, an inspiration for new endeavors, rather than an experiment
to optimize, repeat, and commercialize.154 More generally, scientific
development often proceeds in decidedly nonlinear fashion, with prior
work providing inspiration for follow-on researchers trying to solve a
tangentially related (or even unrelated) problem, rather than serving
as a “building block” that must be in place before another block goes on
top of the first.155 For those sorts of researchers, the information in a
patent or a scientific article is there to be mentally absorbed and then
utilized in creative ways. Thus, once repetition is taken out of the
picture, patent disclosures can, at least in theory, stimulate new
inventions and lead to “important improvements in radically different
directions.”156 Justice Breyer, however, never explicitly considered
benefits of this sort that patent disclosures might provide. His embrace
of the building-block view of science in his patent law opinions, to the
exclusion of other views, is reason enough to reexamine his patentable
subject matter jurisprudence.
Furthermore, unlike copyright law, which might slow
dissemination of technical materials by rendering their reproduction
infringing,157 patent law generally lacks mechanisms that might
affirmatively hinder access to the information in patent
specifications.158 This feature of patent law was highlighted nicely in
forward. See Karshtedt, supra note 119, at 960–69. It has been argued that a more vigorous
experimental use exception is needed to free up researchers’ ability to practice such inventions, if
they are patented. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for
an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Eisenberg, supra note 132;
Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and Research
Tools, 48 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 123 (2008); Mueller, supra note 119; Strandburg, supra note
130, at 123. But the patents litigated in Mayo probably do not fall into this category. See supra
notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
155. Cf. LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS 48–69 (1977) (proposing a nonevolutionary theory of scientific progress); Henry Rosemont, Jr., Against Relativism, in
INTERPRETING ACROSS BOUNDARIES: NEW ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 36, 37 (Gerald
James Larson & Eliot Deutsch eds., 1988) (“Western science, as it turns out, has not been the
building-block, linearly progressive affair we have always thought it to be . . . .”). But cf. Imre
Lakatos, Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 69 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 149 (1968) (proposing a more linear, or evolutionary, view of scientific
progress). See generally Michal Shur-Ofry, Nonlinear Innovation, 62 MCGILL L.J. 563 (2016).
156. See Revision of Statutes Relating to Patents: Hearings on S. 3325 and S. 3410 Before the
S. Comm. on Patents, 67th Cong. 172 (1922); see also id. (“Inventors not only may improve on the
specific idea embodied in the patent already issued and published, but also are inspired to work
out their ideas for accomplishing the same result which the publication of the patent suggests to
them.”); Fromer, supra note 19, at 547–54; Wagner, supra note 33, at 1003–13.
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
158. Cf. Wagner, supra note 33, at 1003–10 (challenging the notion that the “control”
conferred by intellectual property rights prevents information and ideas from entering the public
domain).
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The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy in Patent Law, a recent article
by Professor Kevin Collins.159 Professor Collins observed that some
courts and commentators have failed to distinguish between patenting
knowledge, ideas, or information, which is generally difficult to do, from
patenting embodiments, which is the normal province of patent law.160
He explained:
By making the disclosed knowledge immediately free for all to use qua knowledge, [patent
disclosure] generates “knowledge spillovers” of the patentee’s exclusive rights.
...
[A]lthough the public is prohibited from using the disclosed knowledge in a particular
manner during the patent’s term (that is, to make, sell, offer to sell, or import the claimed
embodiments), patent law does not prevent the public from using the disclosed knowledge
in any other way that it pleases, even if those uses are detrimental to the patentee’s
interests.161

The notion of knowledge spillovers is foundational to patent law
and theory.162 The availability of patenting induces the disclosure of
information, some of which simply cannot be propertized—even during
the term of the patent. As Professor Kenneth Arrow noted, “the inventor
will . . . have considerable difficulty in appropriating the information
produced. Patent laws would have to be unimaginably complex and
subtle to permit such appropriation on a large scale.”163 Thus, any
suggestion that a patent might impede the flow or free exchange of
information must be qualified by these considerations. But Professor
(and Justice) Breyer’s statements about patents in The Uneasy Case
and his LabCorp and Mayo opinions paint a very different picture:
copyright law is bad enough because it hinders the transfer of
expression, and patent law is even worse because it also hinders the
159. Collins, supra note 33.
160. Id. at 1288–94. Justice Breyer, however, repeatedly appears to characterize patents as
capturing knowledge as opposed to embodiments. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text;
see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)
(referring to “patented ideas”); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
127, 134 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari) (citing Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), a Judge Learned Hand opinion that
stands for the proposition that copyright protection extends to expressions, but not to ideas).
161. Collins, supra note 33, at 1316–17.
162. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Copyright law, too, produces spillovers when
the copyrighted matter is disclosed, but the argument in The Uneasy Case is that they cannot be
realized at all if the intellectual property right hinders access to information “at the front end.”
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
163. Arrow, supra note 18, at 617. Of course, the goal of appropriately rewarding the inventor
might be achieved with nonpatent incentives, like government grants. Cf. Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
1115 (2015) (arguing for greater consideration of nonpatent incentives when discussing patentable
subject matter doctrine). But Justice Breyer does not seem to be arguing for, or showing the
existence of, alternative incentive mechanisms of this sort.
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transfer of ideas. But as the foregoing discussion shows, this account is
at best not complete. And at worst, the rule of Mayo is
counterproductive: it could inhibit information flow by discouraging the
filing and publication of patent applications.164
D. Objections
Several objections can be raised at this stage. The first is that
the approach in Mayo is basically correct, but was mistakenly applied
to the specific facts of that case. In other words, one might argue that
Justice Breyer properly formulated the general concern that patents on
early-stage research might interfere with the flow of information and
should, in part for that reason, be disallowed based on patentable
subject matter exclusions implied in § 101—and in particular, the law
of nature (or natural phenomenon) exclusion. Even if the Prometheus
patent might have been incorrectly invalidated, the rationale and the
resulting rule are both sound and will, on the whole, benefit the patent
system.
This objection can be answered with several rejoinders. One is
that the facts of a seminal Supreme Court case like Mayo naturally set
the tone for future development of the law. Unsurprisingly, many
patents invalidated in the wake of Mayo were not drawn to discoveries
of fundamental principles of the E = mc2 variety but, instead, to
methods of using some specific genetic markers or other narrowly
drafted diagnostic or even treatment claims.165 Indeed, facts matter
because the courts’ modus operandi in applying the opaque guidelines
of Mayo and other § 101 cases is to ask whether the patents at issue are
factually similar to the patents that had been invalidated by the
Supreme Court.166 Another, closely related rejoinder is that, given the
character of the patents that were invalidated, lower courts cannot help
but come away with an extremely expansive conception of what a law
164. See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC, No. 1:15CV2331,
2016 WL 705244 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-1766 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2016)
(biomarker for assessing risk of having heart disease); Esoterix Genetic Labs. LLC v. Qiagen Inc.,
133 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D. Mass. 2015) (genetic marker for predicting pharmacological effectiveness);
Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis Inc., No. 14-1381-RGA, 2015 WL 5580488 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2015),
adopted by 2015 WL 7253674 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2015) (method of treatment); Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 12-1736-LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 4379587 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014)
(genetic marker for predicting athletic performance).
166. For an example at the Supreme Court itself, see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct.
2347, 2356–57 (2014) (invalidating the claims at issue because they were similar to the claims held
not patentable in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)). Cf. Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet
Telecom, Inc., No. 2015-1180, 2016 WL 6440387, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2016) (following this
approach in applying the abstract idea exception to patent eligibility under § 101).
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of nature is.167 Finally, the Mayo Court’s dubious reference to
information may have impacted the Court’s own later decision in
Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad,168 which puzzled many a
commentator.169 This case, which invalidated claims to genomic DNA
molecules under the product-of-nature exception to patentability, cites
the “flow of information” language in Mayo and is rife with references
to information.170
Second, one might argue that the alleged invention implicated
in Mayo is too trivial to be patentable, which means that the Court
reached the correct bottom-line result.171 In that vein, one might further
contend that diagnostic inventions of the sort patented by Prometheus
might not only be invented without the incentive of a patent but also
freely disclosed, perhaps in an effort to demonstrate the test’s clinical
validity to the regulatory authorities and the relevant public.
Maybe so. But in responding to this objection, too, it is worth
looking beyond Mayo itself to see the effects of the Mayo rule. Applying
Mayo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom invalidated claims directed to a method
of detecting fetal DNA in maternal plasma and serum.172 The court
reasoned that, similar to the diagnostic inferences in Mayo, the
existence of fetal DNA in maternal plasma and serum was a natural
phenomenon to which the claims did not add an inventive
application.173 But in contrast to the invention patented by Prometheus,
Sequenom’s invention was decidedly not trivial for at least two reasons.
One, before this invention, it was thought that maternal plasma and
serum did not contain useful genetic information, and these materials
were thus typically discarded as medical waste.174 Two, the invention
provided a significantly more practical and safer method of prenatal
testing for genetic abnormalities than the previously available
167. Eisenberg, Need Not Apply, supra note 51, at 265 (“The Court took a very expansive
approach to the identification of natural phenomena in the first step of the analysis in Mayo.”).
But see Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding a
cognizable limit to the Mayo rule in a biotechnology case).
168. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
169. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2014); Peter Lee, The Supreme Court’s Myriad Effects on Scientific
Research: Definitional Fluidity and the Legal Construction of Nature, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1077
(2015).
170. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111–12, 2115–16, 2118, 2120.
171. Indeed, I too ultimately conclude in this Article that the Prometheus invention should
not be patentable. See infra Part III.
172. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
173. Id. at 1376–78.
174. Id. at 1373.
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method.175 Indeed, it is not at all clear that the Sequenom invention
would have been invented and disclosed without the patent incentive.
Several Federal Circuit judges recognized the merits of the invention,
but explained that their hands were tied by Mayo’s broad language.176
One is forced to conclude based on this example that, even if Mayo
invalidated an unmeritorious patent, the case’s overall approach is
nonetheless problematic.
The objector might at this point reply by arguing that the
groundbreaking invention at issue in Ariosa must be ineligible for
patent protection on the disclosure rationale proposed by Professor
Eisenberg,177 or because the patent on the invention was claimed in the
rare form that captures knowledge in the sense suggested by Professor
Collins.178 Putting to one side the incongruity of having the same legal
rule that targets patents on inventions that have diametrically opposed
characteristics—trivial and foundational—one would contend in
response that there is no evidence that either concern applies here. To
the contrary, the discovery captured by the Sequenom patent was
promptly reported in academic literature179 and has been cited
widely180—evidence which militates against an information flow
problem.181 Moreover, there is some evidence that follow-on researchers
were undeterred by the patent; the patentee proffered at least three
academic articles building on the invention, but indisputably
performing research involving activities outside the scope of the
claims.182 As in Mayo, the entities actually accused of infringement were
not building on the invention to generate new knowledge, but offering
a commercial test within the scope of the patentee’s claims. And as for
175. Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring).
176. See id. at 1380; Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., joined by Moore, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en
banc). See generally Philip Merksamer, Note, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of Mayo
and Myriad and Evisceration of Patent Eligibility for Molecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 495 (2016).
177. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
179. Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Presence of Fetal DNA in Maternal Plasma and Serum, 350
LANCET 586 (1997).
180. A Web of Science citation search shows 959 citations. A Google citation search shows
2092 citations.
181. Cf. supra note 134 and accompanying text (suggesting that patents might be restricting
the flow of scientific knowledge).
182. See Farideh Z. Bischoff et al., Detecting Fetal DNA from Dried Maternal Blood Spots:
Another Step Towards Broad Scale Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Screening and Feasible Testing,
6 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 349 (2003); Leo L. Poon et al., Differential DNA Methylation Between
Fetus and Mother as a Strategy for Detecting Fetal DNA in Maternal Plasma, 48 CLINICAL
CHEMISTRY 9 (2002); Jessica M.E. van den Oever et al., Single Molecule Sequencing of Free DNA
from Maternal Plasma for Noninvasive Trisomy 21 Detection, 58 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 699 (2012).
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the capture of knowledge, Professor Collins made clear that his theory
does not apply to the Sequenom patent.183
The Sequenom patent might be the sweet-spot patent—neither
trivial nor so foundational as to hinder downstream research and
information exchange between scientists. Again, that is not to say that
there are no problems with the patent: scholars have expressed
concerns with “commercialization-related barriers to clinical adoption
and patient access”184 caused by patents on prenatal diagnostic tests, as
well as “lower test availability and quality.”185 Concerns about the effect
of patents on the cost and delivery of health are of course quite weighty
and deserve serious consideration from lawmakers, who have
sometimes stepped in when intervention was needed. After, for
example, a doctor found himself defending an infringement suit for
performing a patented surgical procedure,186 Congress passed a statute
that eliminated a remedy for such actions.187 And perhaps government
intervention may be needed when, for example, “the sole provider [of a
diagnostic test] does not have agreements with specific third-party
payers or health plans.”188 But all this is very different from the effect
of patents on the flow of information or on early-stage research.
The first two objections amount to the argument that Mayo is
basically harmless. Given the sorts of patents that are being invalidated
in the wake of Mayo, it is not. The third objection is different, and it
goes to the fundamental premise of this Article. The core of this
objection is that there is, after all, an information flow problem with the
patents at issue in Mayo and LabCorp, but just not in the senses
discussed so far. I examine it in detail in the Part that follows.
III. THE NARROW INFORMATION-FLOW PROBLEM
WITH MAYO AND LABCORP PATENTS
A. The Problem of Claims that Contain Mental Steps
There may be yet another way to rehabilitate Justice Breyer’s
information-access rationale for invalidating the claims litigated in
Mayo and LabCorp. The critique that follows is based in part on the
183. Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 39 n.178).
184. Ashwin Agarwal et al., Commercial Landscape of Noninvasive Prenatal Testing in the
United States, 33 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 521, 528 (2013).
185. Id. at 527.
186. See Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (D. Vt. 1995), further proceedings, Civ.
A. No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. 1996).
187. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).
188. Agarwal et al., supra note 184, at 527.
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work of Professors Kevin Collins,189 Alan Durham,190 and Andrew
Torrance.191 To illustrate the problem, consider the following example
involving a hypothetical patent on the flame test, a classic analytical
technique. Suppose that a researcher discovers and claims a “method of
detecting sodium in a sample by exposing it to a flame, wherein the
intense yellow color of the flame indicates that sodium is present in the
sample.” Inspired by this discovery, another scientist decides to
investigate whether other metals could be detected using the flame test.
Based on the theory of emission spectroscopy, she predicts that
tungsten will give off a green color when exposed to the flame and then
decides to test an unknown metal sample for the presence of tungsten.
But it turns out that the sample contains sodium. The researcher sees
the yellow flame—and now, the claim has been infringed. This is
because the “wherein” element of the claim calls out recognition that
yellow means sodium, and the second researcher cannot help but make
this connection when she sees yellow.
Under these circumstances, the second researcher would
potentially have been better off not having read the patent. For if she
did not know (from the patent) that sodium gave off a yellow flame, the
researcher may not have made the inference covered by the claim’s
“wherein” element, and thus there may not have been an infringement.
To be sure, if not for the patent, she might not have known about the
flame test at all. Still, there is something extremely troubling about the
possibility that a patent might effectively cover an activity as basic as
exposing a metal to a flame, and that reading the patent might make a
difference between liability and no liability.
Of course, patent infringement is a strict liability offense.192 But
if a claim is drafted in such a way as to include an element that is
“performed” when the user merely makes a mental inference, we have
189. Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information qua Information and a Structural Theory
of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 11, 12 (2008); Kevin Emerson Collins,
Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of Insufficient Thought Control, 2007
WIS. L. REV. 759 [hereinafter Collins, Constructive Nonvolition]; Kevin Emerson Collins,
Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 357–60 (2007). Professor Collins initially leveled his
critique against the patents at issue in LabCorp, and then extended it to Mayo. See Collins, supra
note 33; Collins, supra note 51; see also Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of
Inventors’ Disclosure Obligations, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1785 (2016); Kevin Emerson Collins,
Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 391 (2012)
[hereinafter, Collins, Mental Steps].
190. Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L. REV. 933
(2009).
191. Andrew W. Torrance, Neurobiology and Patenting Thought, 50 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 27 (2009).
192. See Hilton Davis Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson, Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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a situation where infringement could be contingent on the user’s
knowledge. It now appears that we have an information-flow problem
after all. In this scenario, patents might deter the dissemination of
ideas and slow the progress of science by rendering noninfringing
activities infringing via mere transfer of information in the patent.
More generally, such patents may inhibit research that properly
attempts to make use of the ideas disclosed in patents in a
noninfringing manner.193
This result seems wrong, and the problem is not merely
hypothetical. In fact, Professor Collins cogently argued194 that the
patent at issue in LabCorp exhibits this very problem: the claims were
directed to “assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total
homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine
in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate,”195 or vitamin
B-12. Thus, a physician ordering a homocysteine assay for a purpose
other than testing for vitamin B-12 deficiency might infringe the patent
because the claimed “correlating” would occur in the physician’s mind
upon inspection of the homocysteine data.196 The patent then, in effect,
covered all homocysteine assays, including those that were previously
known.197
The patents that were litigated in Mayo had a similar problem.
As Mayo Clinic argued to the Supreme Court, one of the defendants was
a doctor who was investigating concentration thresholds of the 6thioguanine metabolite to establish a therapeutic range for the
unclaimed dermatological disorders, rather than the claimed
gastrointestinal ones.198 The theory of infringement appeared to be that
the doctor could not avoid thinking about the implications of the 6-

193. See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.
194. See Collins, Constructive Nonvolition, supra note 189.
195. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 129 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from the order dismissing certiorari) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, claim 13
(filed Nov. 20, 1986)).
196. Collins, Constructive Nonvolition, supra note 189, at 814–20.
197. See id.
198. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 96, at 11; see also Defendants’ Redacted Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment of Patent Invalidity
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, at 17, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 04-CV1200, 2007 WL 623848, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2007):
The physician would . . . be in the position of infringing a patent simply by thinking
about information that the physician in theory should have every right to think about,
i.e., whether or not a particular metabolite level might be a reason for raising or
lowering a dose of drug. . . . [T]he claims to the correlation have the effect of giving
Prometheus a monopoly on the testing of the metabolites in autoimmune patients,
something which has long been in the prior art, because physicians will know of the
correlation regardless of the reason for which they might be testing metabolites.
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thioguanine concentrations for treatment of gastrointestinal conditions
even though this was not the aim of her research.199
Does all this mean that Justice Breyer was correct after all?
While he was certainly correct in the result, he erred in seemingly
suggesting that the patents asserted in Mayo and LabCorp were major
threats to information access based, perhaps, on their questionable
potential to appropriate early-stage research. The brief reference to
“impede[d] flow of information” does not capture the subtle disclosurerelated problem with claims that include steps directed to mental
inferences,200 implying instead that, like copyrights, patents such as
those asserted by Prometheus impede the dissemination of knowledge
writ large. A related point was captured in Durham’s insightful article
written in the wake of LabCorp:
The danger of the LabCorp patent has little to do with research . . . . The greater threat
posed by the LabCorp patent and others of its kind hinges on the role that knowledge
plays in infringement. Even well-intentioned competitors of the patent owner may find
infringement unavoidable, except by cultivating ignorance or abandoning legitimate
activity. This could supply the patent owner with unintended and undesirable market
power.201

Thus, the patents in at issue in LabCorp and Mayo are surely
problematic. But, as noted earlier,202 the rule that Mayo created to deal
with them is grossly overbroad. In applying it, courts have invalidated
patents that include affirmative steps directed to manipulation of
genetic materials203 or even steps directed to patient treatment,204 as
opposed to mental steps, and therefore do not give rise the very limited
disclosure problem raised in LabCorp and Mayo. As noted by others, the
rule is causing serious problems.205 One of them seems to be to push
biotechnology companies toward trade secrecy.206 If this is indeed the
199. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 96, at 11–12.
200. Professor Collins called these types of claims “determine-and-infer” claims. Collins,
Mental Steps, supra note 189, at 394.
201. Durham, supra note 190, at 997; see also Collins, Constructive Nonvolition, supra note
189, at 806–12.
202. See supra notes 172–188 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
204. See, e.g., Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis Inc., No. 14-1381-RGA, 2015 WL 5580488 (D. Del.
Sept. 23, 2015), adopted by 2015 WL 7253674 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2015).
205. Eisenberg, Need Not Apply, supra note 51; Holman, supra note 51; Taylor, supra note 51.
206. Erin Coe, Weakened Patent Rights Make Trade Secrets More Attractive, LAW360 (Apr. 1,
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/523575/weakened-patent-rights-make-trade-secrets-moreattractive [https://perma.cc/5MQU-67XF] (summarizing attorney views that Mayo could be among
reasons to push certain firms toward trade secrecy); supra note 43 and accompanying text; see
David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1091, 1114 (2012) (arguing that Mayo “could cause life science and other companies to
reconsider whether to pursue patent or trade secret protection”); Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu,
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trend, the result would be reduced disclosure, which is contrary to the
aims Justice Breyer sought to further in his writings. Moreover, “trade
secrecy limits cumulative innovation, where different innovators build
on the inventions and innovations of other firms.”207 These potential
consequences of the Mayo rule are at least worth considering.208
B. Possible Solutions to the Mental Steps Problem
As discussed in the previous Section, any information-flow
problem with the patents at issue in Mayo and LabCorp relates to the
capture of subject matter that is in the public domain, or otherwise
unclaimed, via claims whose inventiveness lies in the mental
recognition of new significance of a known activity. Where does this
leave us? Perhaps § 101 may still have a role to play in dealing with
such patents, though not through the law of nature exclusion. Professor
Collins took this approach in a recent article, in which he proposed to
cabin Mayo based on the intuition that “it is the mental nature of the
diagnostic inference that employs the correlation as a premise that is
the crux of the patentability problem.”209 Professor Collins explained
that § 101-based arguments against diagnostic-type patents still have
their place based on what he terms the “counteraction theory” of patent
eligibility. He maintained that this approach is necessary in part
because other requirements of patentability cannot effectively deal with
claims that reach an impermissibly broad scope through inclusion of
mental steps at the point of novelty.210 Accordingly, the role of § 101 is
The Intersection of Patents and Trade Secrets, 27 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 189, 202 (2015)
(“Clearly, trade secret protection is more desirable for inventions that are potentially patent
ineligible.”); W. Nicholson Price, Big Data, Patents, and The Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1402, 1407 (2016) (“[F]irms may increasingly turn away from the patent system and rely
instead on trade secrecy law and practices to protect proprietary data and algorithms.”); see also
id. at 1425. But cf. Tony Dutra, New Trade Secret Law: More to Consider in Patent Trade-Off,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 3, 2016), http://www.bna.com/new-trade-secret-n57982073569
[https://perma.cc/Z9ZU-AYR9] (quoting email messages to the author from Bruce J. Rose and
Jonathan M. Gordon) (noting that for certain inventions like drugs, “[t]rade secret protection
‘would be quite limited given the strict disclosure and testing requirements of government agencies
such as the FDA’ ”).
207. Price, supra note 206, at 1419.
208. I argued in earlier work that trade secrecy might be socially favored over patenting over
some circumstances. See Dmitry Karshtedt, supra note 17, at 312–18. So did others. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 23; see also Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade
Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008); Strandburg, supra note 130, at 104–07
(discussing comparative benefits of patent and trade secret protection). However, once the flow of
information is made a priority, it would seem that trade secrecy would be incompatible with that
goal.
209. Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 37).
210. Id. (manuscript at 38).
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to “counteract”211 the failure of the other requirements for obtaining
patents.212
I think that Professor Collins’s approach has much to
recommend it—for one thing, the Sequenom patent would remain valid
under his interpretation of Mayo.213 I part ways with Professor Collins,
however, in that I maintain that established approaches to
patentability can in fact handle claims such as those litigated in Mayo
and LabCorp, obviating the need for “counteraction” via development of
new § 101 doctrine. I now explore additional solutions relying on § 102,
the Patent Act’s novelty provision, and on the requirement of proof of
intent, to deal with the mental-steps problem.214 I begin with § 102.
1. Novelty and Patentable Weight
Let us return to the flame test example. One might intuitively
argue that people have exposed metal samples to a flame from time
immemorial, and a claim cannot render this activity infringing even
when it incorporates the novel discovery that sodium turns a flame
yellow. This problem can be addressed by the principle that “merely
discovering and claiming a new benefit of an old process cannot render
the process again patentable.”215 This principle has sometimes been

211. While conceding that this interpretation “cut[s] against the grain of the opinion’s ‘laws
of nature’ rhetoric,” Professor Collins nonetheless maintained that Mayo should be “interpreted in
a mind-centered, not nature-centered, manner.” Id. (manuscript at 37–38); see also Collins, supra
note 33, at 1315–21.
212. There is some debate as to whether § 101 is actually a “condition for patentability” in the
same way that §§ 102, 103, 112, and 116 are—for example, for the purposes of invalidating issued
patents in litigation under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2). See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Hricik: Why Section 101
is Neither a “Condition of Patentability” nor an Invalidity Defense, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/09/hricik-why-section-101-is-neither-a-condition-ofpatentability-nor-an-invalidity-defense.html
[https://perma.cc/TZ2G-CABT]
(collecting
arguments). Courts, however, have so far treated § 101 as any other patentability requirement.
See, e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 661
(Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1329–30 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
213. Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 39 n.178).
214. I am not the first to suggest that Prometheus’s claims could have been invalidated under
provisions other than § 101. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 28–30, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4040414, at *28–30. The discussion that follows, however,
specifically addresses the role of other patentability requirements, particularly § 102, in dealing
with the threat of patents to information transfer.
215. In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted); see also Atlas
Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he discovery of a previously
unappreciated property of a prior art composition . . . does not render the old composition
patentably new to the discoverer.”); Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent
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understood as a restatement of the doctrine of inherent anticipation,
which is a gloss on § 102.216 This doctrine holds that a prior art reference
that does not expressly disclose a particular limitation may nonetheless
anticipate (i.e., render non-novel) a patent claim if that limitation is
necessarily present in the reference given the other disclosures.217 With
respect to Prometheus’s claims, Professor Collins explained that this
formulation makes inherency an uneasy fit because the information
captured in a “wherein”-type limitation is a “novel mental
representation” rather than a necessary property of the prior art test.218
Therefore, Professor Collins concluded, claims asserted in Mayo cannot
be invalidated under inherent anticipation.219 His concern was in fact
borne out in the closely similar LabCorp case, where the Federal Circuit
rejected an inherent anticipation challenge—holding that the mental
“correlating” step was not inherently present in prior art disclosure.220
To this, I have two responses. One is that the Federal Circuit’s
view of inherent anticipation is overly cramped.221 Although, as
Professor Collins argued, one role of inherency is to prevent density or
undue proliferation of patents,222 the major justification for the doctrine
is to eliminate what Professors Robert Merges and John Duffy called
“backsliding”—in other words, the capture of subject matter that is
already available to the public to practice without the encumbrance of
a patent.223 If so, it is not unreasonable to extend the doctrine to cover
claims like those at issue in LabCorp and Mayo. One way to do so is to
Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 291 (2012) (“[T]he claimed method of using the old object must
also recite a new manipulative step.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
216. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371
(2005).
217. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377–81 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying
the doctrine of inherent anticipation); In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349–52 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (same). For a further exploration of the connection between §§ 101 and 102, see Dan L.
Burk, Anticipating Patentable Subject Matter, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 111 (2013),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/02/Burk_65_SLRO_109.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26Q9-S269].
218. Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 25–26).
219. See id. (discussing the role of inherent anticipation).
220. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
221. Cf. King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(applying the “printed matter” doctrine in a manner that resembles the doctrine of inherent
anticipation). Another, related approach is to argue that certain method claims do not qualify as
“a new use of a known process” under 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). In re Ducci, 225 F.2d 683, 687–88
(C.C.P.A. 1955). I thank Josh Sarnoff for pointing me to this case. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying this rule).
222. Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 39).
223. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 354–77 (6th ed. 2013).
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hold that any mental inference drawn from prior art activities, like the
assaying in LabCorp or administering and determining in Mayo, is per
se inherently disclosed.224 This rule would be sensible because it would
ensure that the novelty requirement serves its essential purpose of
safeguarding the public domain.225 Although the mental representation
recited in a claim may well be novel, the fact that downstream users
cannot help forming it, even when they seek merely to perform steps in
the public domain, suggests that the inherent anticipation doctrine is
properly deployed to rule the claim invalid. As one Federal Circuit
opinion explained, “If granting patent protection on the disputed claim
would allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior
art, then that claim is anticipated.”226
Second, another line of Federal Circuit precedent arguably
already supports this result. The relevant doctrine holds that the
recognition of a new benefit or result of a known process cannot be
accorded patentable weight during construction of the patent claims.227
Although the invalidity and claim construction instantiations of the
“new benefit of old process” principle call for different burdens of proof
on the accused infringer, they lead to essentially the same outcome in
the end.228 The accused infringer in LabCorp, to be sure, failed to make
this argument, essentially conceding that “correlating” was a “positive

224. In some contexts, the Federal Circuit appears to have accepted this reasoning. See supra
note 215 and accompanying text; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb, 246 F.3d at 1376; cf. Perricone v.
Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (characterizing Bristol-Myers Squibb
as standing for the proposition that “newly discovered results of known processes are not
patentable because those results are inherent in the known processes”). See generally EMI Grp. N.
Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
225. This issue resembles the problem of withdrawing material from the public domain in
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 906–07, 912 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting), though not in the other
copyright opinions that Justice Breyer wrote.
226. Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
227. Cf. Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] whereby clause
in a method claim is not given weight when it simply expresses the intended result of a process
step positively recited.” (quoting Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2003))). A similar rule governs “wherein” clauses, such as those at issue in Mayo. See U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.04 (9th ed.
2014) [hereinafter MPEP]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
supra note 214, at 28–29 (arguing that the language following “wherein” in Prometheus’s claims
has no “patentable weight”). But cf. In re Jasinski, 508 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).
228. In addition, this approach does not require the application of the highly rigid inherent
anticipation test, though it has its own problems—like the “meaning and purpose” test. See MPEP,
supra note 227, § 2111.04 (quoting Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Again,
the doctrine can be straightened out by keeping a key policy goal of the patent system—protection
from patent coverage of the subject matter in the public domain and of unclaimed subject matter
generally—firmly in mind.
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limitation.”229 Had the argument been successfully made, however,
perhaps the claim could have failed on novelty grounds after all. The
claims litigated in Mayo, too, could have been invalidated under the
“new benefit of an old process” approach230—and, indeed, it has been
suggested that those claims would not and should not have survived a
challenge based on the prior art.231
These results would have avoided the potential appropriation of
subject matter in the public domain, but using the chisel of § 102 rather
than the hammer of § 101 that Justice Breyer tested out in LabCorp
and swung in Mayo. Instead, the narrow information-access problem
generated by claims with a mental step at the point of novelty has led,
perhaps needlessly,232 to an uncontrolled expansion of the law of nature
doctrine.233 In an area of law as complex as patents, judicial minimalism
is probably a virtue.234 Rather than rely on the “gatekeeper” function of
§ 101,235 it might have been more advisable to use a problem-specific
rule to deal with the issue of capture of unclaimed material. The § 102based approaches rooted in inherency or claim construction could have
229. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
230. See supra notes 215–227 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra
note 214, at 26–33; see also Taylor, supra note 51 (manuscript at 56).
232. Although arguments have been made that the Prometheus and LabCorp patents should
have been invalidated on other grounds, it should be noted that only § 101 was raised in the
Questions Presented in both cases. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 992001, at *i (raising
only the § 101 issue); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526, at *i (not raising the § 102 issue,
although it was squarely decided below).
233. But see Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1050–51 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (distinguishing Mayo in a biotechnology case and finding the claims at issue patent-eligible).
234. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 192 (1996). For a
deeper exploration of this thesis, see, for example, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 259
(1999):
[M]inimalism has distinctive virtues, especially in a heterogeneous society in which
reasonable people often disagree. When judges lack, and know they lack, relevant
information, minimalism is an appropriate response. Sometimes judicial minimalism is
a reasonable or even inevitable response to the sheer practical problem of obtaining
consensus amid pluralism. Within the Supreme Court, . . . this problem produces
incompletely specified abstractions and incompletely theorized, narrow rulings.
While Professor Sunstein focuses his approach mainly on constitutional adjudication, it is
applicable to non-statutory patentable subject matter exclusions—which might have a
constitutional dimension. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness
and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity
to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1307–13 (2011); supra
notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
235. See Sichelman, supra note 49, at 372 (arguing that “gatekeeping rules often take on a
life of their own, continually removing themselves with each additional judicial opinion or agency
interpretation from their fundamental purposes”).
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provided the minimalist path by targeting the limited mental steps
problem in a narrowly tailored way.
2. Construing Claims to Include an Intent Element
More difficult questions can arise when a claimed method does
not recite a known test like the homocysteine assay in LabCorp, but
includes process limitations that are specifically targeted to the new
information to be obtained. This kind of a claim is best illustrated by an
example. In Griffin v. Bertina, the representative claim was directed to
[a] method for diagnosing an increased risk for thrombosis or a genetic defect causing
thrombosis comprising the steps of:
(A) obtaining . . . test nucleic acid comprising codon 506 within EXON 10 of the human
Factor V gene; and
(B) assaying for the presence of a point mutation in the nucleotides of codon 506 within
EXON 10 of the human Factor V gene, wherein said point mutation correlates to a
decrease in the degree of inactivation of human Factor V . . . by activated protein
C, wherein the presence of said point mutation in said test nucleic acid indicates an
increased risk for thrombosis or a genetic effect causing thrombosis.236

This claim, whose structure is similar to the claim at issue in
LabCorp, would almost certainly be invalid under § 101 today because
of its “determine-and-infer” character.237 But it is worth examining
whether this sort of a claim might realistically impede the flow of
information in the same way that the flame test claim or the LabCorp
(and Mayo) claims likely could. While testing genes for point mutations
(i.e., mutations in which the “mutant” gene deviates from the normal or
“wild-type” gene by a single nucleotide) is well-known, the claim does
not have the potential to capture this fundamental technique because
it is directed specifically to the testing of codon 506. More importantly,
the testing of this specific codon for a point mutation was not an activity
in the prior art.238 Indeed, “nucleic acid comprising codon 506 within
EXON 10 of the human Factor V gene” had no scientific value until it
was discovered that point mutations in this gene were predictive of
thrombosis.239 Accordingly, the principle that “merely discovering and

236. 285 F.3d 1029, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
237. See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also supra note 165 and accompanying
text.
238. Griffin, 285 F.3d at 1034.
239. Id. at 1031–34. Technically, this issue arose in the context of an interference
proceeding—a priority contest between multiple inventors seeking a patent on “the same or
substantially the same subject matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1) (2006). Bertina, who first recognized
and claimed this utility of testing codon 506 for a point mutation, was awarded the patent. Griffin,
285 F.3d at 1035.
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claiming a new benefit of an old process cannot render the process again
patentable” does not have an application here.240
Nevertheless, some discomfort remains. For a researcher who is
genuinely looking for a new application of assaying the nucleotides of
codon 506 for a point mutation, there is a problem similar to that with
the hypothetical scenario of the flame test patent. Since the claims are
limited to the diagnosis of thrombosis, it would seem that the follow-on
researcher should be able to search for new uses of the codon 506 test
without the danger of infringing the patent through a reflexive act of
thought. In other words, upon reading the patent and learning that a
point mutation on that codon is predictive of thrombosis, the researcher
cannot unthink this application of the correlation, even if that
researcher is looking for something new. How do we allow this person
to study the codon without the reflexive infringement?241
One solution, suggested in Professor Collins’s early work, is an
intent requirement to prove infringement in cases like this.242 Although
it is true that direct infringement does not require a showing of intent
to infringe,243 the claims at issue here could be construed to include
their own element of intent because they recite what the newly invented

240. In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted). And indeed, the
MPEP uses this case as an example where a “wherein” clause in fact has patentable weight. See
MPEP, supra note 227, § 2111.04.
241. Cf. Collins, Constructive Nonvolition, supra note 189, at 814–24.
242. Id. In his more recent work, Professor Collins has been less optimistic that the
requirement of intent can play a meaningful role in this area because of the difficulty of
enforcement by the patentee. Collins, supra note 51 (manuscript at 27–28). I am sympathetic to
the idea that proof of intent is difficult. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and
Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2744427
[https://perma.cc/S5DN-X94D]. But the patentee would rather have a patent that is difficult to
enforce than no patent at all due to § 101. Moreover, in spite of the rigorous intent requirements
to prove indirect infringement, which include knowledge of the patent and the lack of a good-faith
belief in noninfringement, see Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926–28
(2015), it must be conceded the patentee has met them in significant cases. See, e.g., Lucent Techs.,
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, it would seem, communications
between doctors and testing laboratories in cases involving claims like those in Griffin, as well as
the doctors’ own notes or testimony from patients, might readily allow fact-finders to draw an
inference of intent to infringe. Cf. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (establishing intent sufficient for indirect infringement). Moreover,
claims reciting an intent limitation actually reflect what the patentee invented—for example, a
test for a point mutation in the nucleotides of codon 506 for the purpose of diagnosing thrombosis,
not for any other purpose.
243. See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text; see also Chin, supra note 215, at 291–
92 (“[I]nfringement doctrine does not treat a preambular purpose as an essential property of a
patent claim, because intent is not an element of infringement.” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). But cf. Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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processes of assaying codon 506 for a point mutation is for.244 If so, then
perhaps the patentee must prove that the accused infringer looked for
a point mutation in the codon’s nucleotides with the claimed purpose of
diagnosing an increased risk of thrombosis—and if his or her intent
were different, the infringement claim would fail. Patent law has
handled intent in other contexts,245 and there is no reason why it cannot
do so here. Given the fact that the step of assaying codon 506 for a point
mutation for any purpose was not in the public domain, follow-on
researchers would perhaps not be unduly burdened from looking for
new uses of the test if the requirement of proof of intent is in place.246
Again, this would be a narrow solution targeted to the specific problem
with many of the claims that are now addressed under the patentable
subject matter requirement.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Justice Breyer was correct to conclude that patents
in LabCorp, and likely in Mayo, should be held invalid. Moreover, he
was also accurate in his general diagnosis that the patents at issue
presented information-access concerns of some sort. The particular
problem these patents created was effective blockage of access to
unpatented processes by including steps directed to mental inferences.
In an indirect way, then, a noninfringer could turn into an infringer
merely after consuming information in a patent and performing an
otherwise unpatented method.247
But unlike copyright in scientific articles, these patents—and
many others invalidated in the wake of Mayo—have not presented some
generalized threat to the dissemination of knowledge.248 The problem of
information access is simply less salient for patents than it is for
copyrights. Moreover, patents, in contrast to copyrights, are more
specifically designed to do just the opposite—to force disclosure of
information. To the extent that the information-access problem exists
244. But see David A. Kelly, What Constitutes a “New Use” of a Known Composition and
Should a Patentee’s Purported Objective Make Any Difference?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 319 (2005).
245. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
246. While there are administrative costs to defending allegations of intent, state of mind does
need to be pled with particularity. Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 620 F.
App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (non-precedential); In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing
Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Caroline N. Mitchell & David L.
Wallach, Pleading State of Mind After Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2009 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 201.
247. See supra notes 191–197 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II (explaining the role of patents in the process of dissemination of
knowledge).
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in patent law in the form of claims that encroach upon the public
domain, the novelty requirement has long been in place to address this
very problem. And to the extent that follow-on researchers might be
deterred from reading certain patents because of the possibility of
becoming infringers through reflexive thought, the problem could also
be addressed by imposing the requirement to prove intent to infringe in
certain contexts.249
Reliance on similarities between copyrights and patents has its
place, but it must not be taken too far. Unlike copyrights in technical
articles, patents are generally unlikely to halt the spread of ideas—if
for no other reason than that they are intended to do the opposite.
Because Justice Breyer’s patent law jurisprudence might rest on a
questionable parallel between patent and copyright, it ought to be
reexamined.

249. Because of space constraints, I do not extensively consider another set of potential
solutions—involving an experimental use exception or some form of copyright-style fair use
defense to patent infringement—for dealing with problems that some patents might cause for
cumulative innovation. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
(2012) (providing downstream researchers with a shield from infringement liability in specific
circumstances); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 5 (2007) (“Expansion of the statutory safe harbor defense may be appropriate
in promoting the creation and dissemination of information, particularly in light of the Federal
Circuit’s evisceration of the common law ‘experimental use’ defense.” (citing Madey v. Duke Univ.,
307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2000) (proposing a fair use defense to patent
infringement); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 292–304
(2011) (similar); Taylor, supra note 51 (manuscript at 45–46) (arguing that § 101 is doing some of
the work that the experimental use exception should be doing); cf. Ouellette, supra note 132
(discussing and critiquing calls for the experimental use exception for academic scientists). If
experimental use shields are applied, it is essential for the rules to make clear ex ante how the
liability would be limited. See Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 599, 635 (2009) (“Indeterminate ex post interference in proprietary rights by courts tends to
inject further uncertainty into an already flawed system, to undermine efficient contractual
exchange, and to endanger ex ante technological research.”).

